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TRUSTS-PAYMENT OR DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS
OF TRUST PROPERTY: CATEGORIZING A TRUST FOR
THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY
FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
Hecker v. Stark County Social Service Board,
527 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1994)
I. FACTS
Herman Hecker is a developmentally disabled fifty-four year old
male who resides in a group home. ' He is the sole beneficiary of a trust
(the Hecker trust) established by his now-deceased mother, Wilhelmina
Hecker. 2 The trust was established in 1984 and amended and restated in
1987.3 In Article III of the restated trust agreement, the settlor expressed
that it was her intention in creating the trust that "it continue in existence
as a supplemental fund to public assistance for her handicapped child,
Herman Hecker." 4 Distribution of trust assets to or for the benefit of
the beneficiary were to be made "as the Trustee in the Trustee's sole
discretion may from time to time deem necessary or advisable for the
satisfaction of the beneficiary's special needs." 5
In June 1993, Hecker applied to the Stark County Social Service
Board (the Board) for medical assistance benefits from the state-adminis-
tered Medicaid program. 6 The Board determined that the value of
Hecker's assets exceeded the prescribed maximum of $3,000.00, and
denied his application. 7 Hecker appealed the Board's denial to the
North Dakota Department of Human Services (the Department), which
upheld the Board's denial.8 The Department's hearing officer found
the Hecker trust to be a support trust, and its assets were deemed to be
available to Hecker for his support. 9 The Department's order was
1. Hecker v. Stark County Soc. Serv. Bd., 527 N.W.2d 226, 228 (N.D. 1994). Justice Beryl
Levine wrote for the majority.
2. Id.
3. Id. The trust established by Wilhelmina Hecker was originally a revocable trust, but it became
irrevocable by her death on July 23, 1992. Brief of Appellant, at 4, Hecker v. Stark County Soc. Serv.
Bd., 527 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1994) (No. 94-0180).
4. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 228.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 229. This application and subsequent appeals were made through Herman's brother and
guardian, Peter Hecker, the trustee of the Hecker trust. Id.
7. Id. The prescribed $3,000.00 maximum is set by North Dakota Administrative Code section
75-02-02.1-26. For the purposes of this appeal, the value of the trust corpus was significant only as a
disqualifying asset. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 229 n.2. Neither party raised the issue of distribution of
trust income to Herman from the trust corpus, which was valued at $81,000.00. Id.
8. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 229.
9. Id.; see N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(3)(a) (1994) (defining a "support trust" as a trust
which has the support or care of a beneficiary as a purpose of the trust).
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appealed by Hecker to Burleigh County District Court, which affirmed
the Department's decision.10 Hecker then appealed to the North Dakota
Supreme Court.'1
Since the issue on appeal stemmed from an administrative agency
decision, the record reviewed was that of the administrative agency, and
not that of the district court. 12 The issue before the court was whether
the factual conclusions of the agency were supported by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 13 The standard of judicial review was "whether a
reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual
conclusions reached were proved by the weight of the evidence from the
entire record."' 14
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and rem-
anded.15 The court held that a parent may establish a trust to benefit an
adult developmentally disabled child which provides funds for special
needs that are not provided for by public assistance without making the
beneficiary ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits.16
II. LEGAL HISTORY
A. THE MEDICAID PROGRAM
Medicaid is a program which provides medical assistance to the
disabled and elderly of limited resources. 17 The program is jointly
funded by federal and state governments. 18 Each state which has elected
to participate in the Medicaid program has the authority to set eligibility
requirements for medical assistance, but this authority is limited by
federal regulations.19
10. Hecker, 527 N.w.2d at 229.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-19 to -21 (1995) (requiring the court to consider the
record of the agency's determination and affirm unless the agency's factual conclusions were not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence).
13. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 229 (citing Hins v. Lucas W., 484 N.W.2d 491,494 (N.D. 1992) (re-
versing a denial of unemployment compensation benefits by Job Service North Dakota on the grounds
that Job Service's findings were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence)).
14. Id. at 229 (citing Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214,220 (N.D. 1979) (holding that
the statutory requirement that the supreme court determine on review whether an administrative
agency's findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence is constitutional)).
15. Id. at 228.
16. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court instructed the district court to remand to the Depart-
ment for a redetermination of Herman's eligibility for Medicaid benefits without considering the value
of the trust corpus as an asset. Id. at 236.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396d (1988). Medicaid is also known as the Medical Assistance
Program.
18. § 1396a(a)(2).
19. § 1396a(a)(17). Arizona has elected not to participate in the Medicaid program, but does
offer its own alternative medical assistance program. 3 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE 5 15,554.
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For a majority of states, eligibility for Medicaid is based on Supple-
mental Security Income eligibility guidelines. 20 A minority of states,
including North Dakota, have been authorized to employ eligibility
requirements more restrictive than Social Security Insurance (SSI)
eligibility guidelines. 21 These states, commonly referred to as "section
209(b) states," had employed more restrictive guidelines prior to the
1972 amendments to the Social Security Act, and were allowed by the
amendments to retain their own guidelines. 22
Federal guidelines also require states to provide coverage for the
"categorically needy." 23  Additionally, a state may opt to extend
coverage to the "medically needy." 24 North Dakota is one state which
has elected to provide coverage to the "medically needy."25
As a "section 209(b) state," a state is allowed to employ eligibility
guidelines for "categorically needy" recipients which are more restric-
tive than SSI guidelines. 26 However, even a "section 209(b)" state is
bound to use a financial methodology no more restrictive than that of
SSI once it has opted to provide coverage to the "medically needy." 27
Thus, North Dakota, as "section 209(b) state" which has opted to
provide Medicaid coverage to the "medically needy," is bound to
employ an eligibility methodology which is no more restrictive than SSI
guidelines .28
An applicant's assets are classified by SSI program regulations as
"available assets" when the applicant has an actual ability to obtain
resources from them.29 Available assets are defined as those resources in
which the applicant has a legal interest in a liquidated sum and over
which he or she has the legal ability to compel distribution for his
support. 30 Therefore, assets held in trust may affect the eligibility of the
20. Mayer Y. Silber, The Effect of a Trust on the Eligibility of Liability of the Trust Beneficiary for
Public Assistance, 26 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 133, 138, n.15 (1991) (citing Carol Ann Mooney,
Discretionary Trusts: An Estate Plan to Supplement Public Assistance for Disabled Persons, 25 ARIZ.
L. REV. 939, 966 n.154 (1983)). The financial methodology used by these states to determine Medi-
caid eligibility "shall be no more restrictive than the methodology which would be employed under the
supplemental security income program in the case of groups consisting of aged, blind, or disabled
individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) (1988).
21. See Silber, supra note 20, at 139.
22. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 209(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1381
(1972).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1988). Individuals considered to be "categorically needy"
include those eligible to receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or SSI benefits. Id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C). The "medically needy" are those individuals who lack the
ability to pay for medical expenses, yet have incomes too large to qualify as "categorically needy."
Id.
25. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-05(3) (1994).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (1988).
27. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III).
28. Hecker, 527 N.w.2d at 233.
29. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a)(1) (1995).
30. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(D) (1994).
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beneficiary if the assets are considered to be available to the applicant. 31
The type of trust in which the assets are held is important, as some will
give to the beneficiary the legal right to compel distribution,3 2 while
others will not.3
3
North Dakota has authorized the Department of Human Services to
implement and promulgate Medicaid program regulations, including
eligibility requirements.3 4 These rules, when properly promulgated, have
the force and effect of law.
3 5
In North Dakota, Medicaid eligibility is based on a consideration of
whether an applicant has sufficient assets to meet the needs of necessary
medical care.3 6 All of an applicant's available assets, including trust
assets, are considered, unless those assets are exempt.37
B. TYPES OF TRUSTS
North Dakota Administrative Code section 75-02-02.1-31 sets forth
five classifications of trusts. 38 A trust is classified by the North Dakota
Administrative Code as revocable-irrevocable, Medicaid qualifying,
support, discretionary, or other. 39 The classification of a trust can be
determinative of an applicant's eligibility, because classification defines
the availability of trust assets. 40
31. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-31 (1994).
32. § 75-02-02.1-31(3)(b).
33. § 75-02-02.1-31(4)(a).
34. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-01.1 (1989). In determining eligibility, the Department considers
whether the applicant has sufficient assets to meet the costs of necessary medical care and services. §
50-24.1-02. All assets available to the applicant are considered. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-
25(1) (1994).
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-03(3) (Supp. 1995). When promulgating rules, a state agency is
not allowed to exceed its statutory authority. See Berger v. State Personnel Bd., 502 N.W.2d 539, 542
(N.D. 1993) (establishing that an administrative regulation may not exceed statutory authority, and that
a regulation which exceeds legislative authorization is void) (citing Moore v. N.D. Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 374 N.W.2d 71,74 (N.D. 1985)). In North Dakota, this limitation on the rule
making ability of the agency also includes the inability to overrule or ignore judicial precedent. See
Public Serv. Comm'n v. City of Williston, 160 N.W.2d 534, 537-38 (N.D. 1968) (ruling that the Public
Service Commission did not have the power to reverse a ruling of the North Dakota Supreme Court
which stated the Commission did not have the power to control electricity rates charged by a utility to a
city). The North Dakota Supreme Court has previously ruled that an agency regulation which exceeds
the agency's authority is void and without force. Berger, 502 N.W.2d at 539.
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-02 (1989).
37. N.D. ADMIN. CODE §§ 75-02-02.1-25 to -31 (1994). North Dakota Administrative Code







A revocable trust grants someone, usually the settlor, the power to
remove all or some of the property from the trust.41 Under an irrevoca-
ble trust, this power does not exist. 42 A beneficiary of an irrevocable
trust must count as his or her available assets the greater of the amount
actually distributed from the trust and the amount which must be distrib-
uted under the terms of the trust, whether or not it is actually
distributed. 43 Amounts actually distributed are not considered if the
trust is classified as a Medicaid-qualifying or support trust.44 Therefore,
the beneficiary of an irrevocable trust which is a support or Medicaid
qualifying trust must count all trust assets as available assets, whether or
not actually distributed.45
2. Support Trusts
A support trust directs the trustee to distribute trust income or
principal as necessary for the support or maintenance of the
beneficiary. 46 The North Dakota Administrative Code defines a support
trust as a trust which has as a general purpose the provision of care to the
beneficiary. 47 Conventionally, words such as "support," "care," or
"maintenance" are present in the trust instrument, although no particu-
lar language is necessary to create a support trust. 48 A support trust also
includes trusts which are called "discretionary support trusts" or
"discretionary trusts," as long as support is a trust purpose.49
The supreme court has concluded that all assets held in a trust with a
support purpose are properly considered a beneficiary's assets when
determining a beneficiary's eligibility for state assistance. 50 In Bohac v.
Graham,5 1 the court upheld a North Dakota Department of Human
Services ruling which denied medical benefits to the trust beneficiary
because her assets, including the trust corpus, exceeded eligibility
41. Id.
42. Id.; see Brief of Appellant at 4, Hecker (No. 94-0180) (stating that no funds have been
expended because the trust is irrevocable).
43. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(1)(d) (1994).
44. Id.
45. Id. Medicaid-qualifying trusts need not be considered here as the Hecker trust was not a
Medicaid-qualifying trust because it was not established, as required, by the beneficiary or his spouse.
See § 75-02-02.1-31(2)(a)(1) (defining a Medicaid-qualifying trust as one which in pertinent part is
established by an individual or his spouse and has the individual as the trust beneficiary).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 (1959).
47. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(3)(a).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Bohac v. Graham, 424 N.W.2d 144, 148 (N.D. 1988) (finding that the trust a support trust
since it had been created with the settlor's intent of providing for future care of the beneficiary).
51. 424 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1988).
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guidelines.52 Under this ruling, the trustee was compelled to use trust
assets for the beneficiary's support.
53
3. Discretionary Trusts
A trustee of a discretionary trust may not be compelled to distribute
trust assets, even if needed for the support of the beneficiary. 54 A
discretionary trust gives the trustee complete discretion to distribute all,
some, or none of the trust assets to the beneficiary, as the trustee sees
fit.55 Only those distributions of trust income or corpus actually made
by the trustee may be considered as assets for eligibility purposes.
56
Since distribution cannot be compelled, the corpus of a discretionary
trust is not considered an asset of the beneficiary for the purpose of
determining eligibility.57
C. THE CLASSIFICATION OF A TRUST
North Dakota case law has established that conflicts over classifica-
tions of trusts may be settled by ascertaining the intent of the settlor.5 8
The settlor's intent is a question of fact. 59 Intent is established by the
language of the trust instrument. 60 The court has the duty to uphold the
settlor's intent as long as it does not -violate public policy. 61 If a trust
instrument is unambiguous, the settlor's intent must be determined from
the trust document itself.62 The issue of ambiguity is a question of law,
fully reviewable on appeal.63
52. Bohac v. Graham, 424 N.W.2d 144, 148 (N.D. 1988); see also N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-
02.1-26 (providing that an individual may not be eligible for assistance if his assets exceed $3,000.00).
53. See Bohac, 424 N.W.2d at 147.
54. Id. at 146; see also N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(4)(a) (providing that the term
discretionary trust does not include trusts which are defined as support trusts under subsection 2).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 (1959).
56. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(4)(b).
57. Id.
58. In re Larson, 341 N.W.2d 627, 629 (N.D. 1983) (establishing the primary objective of the
court in construing a trust instrument is to ascertain the intent of the settlor).
59. In re Estate of Klein, 434 N.W.2d 560, 561 (N.D. 1989) (stating that a trial court's finding
concerning the testator's intent will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous) (citing Schatz v.
Schatz, 419 N.W.2d 903 (1988)).
60. Larson, 341 N.W.2d at 629.
61. Hecker v. Stark County Soc. Serv. Bd., 527 N.W.2d 226, 230 (citing In re Leona Carlisle
Trust, 498 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1993)).
62. Bohac v. Graham, 424 N.W.2d 144, 146 (N.D. 1988) (finding that a testamentary trust was
ambiguous as to whether it was a discretionary or support trust so that extrinsic evidence must be
considered to determine the settlor's intent).




The primary issue on appeal was the North Dakota Department of
Human Service's classification of the Hecker trust as a support trust. 64
The Department supported its classification of the Hecker trust with
arguments concerning the nature of the trust, the effect of administrative
regulations, and public policy. 65 Because this case was reviewed on
appeal from an administrative agency decision, the North Dakota
Supreme Court was required to consider the record of the agency's
determination and affirm the finding of the agency unless its factual
conclusions were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 66
The Department's classification of the Hecker trust determined what
assets it could consider when evaluating Hecker's eligibility for
Medicaid. 67 The Department agreed that the plain language of the trust
instrument indicated the settlor did not intend the trust to be a support
trust.68 However, it argued that North Dakota Administrative Code
section 75-02-02.1-31(3) operated to negate both the plain language of
the instrument and the stated intent of the settlor.69 Under its application
of the regulation, the Department concluded that, regardless of the
nature of the trust, the entire trust corpus was available to Herman for his
support .70
The Department also argued that even if North Dakota Administra-
tive Code section 75-02-02.1-31 could not be employed, the supplemen-
tal and special needs provisions of the Hecker trust should be disregard-
ed because they violated both North Dakota and federal public policy. 71
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the disputed portion of
North Dakota Administrative Code section 75-02-02.1-31(3)(a), as
64. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 229.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-19 to -21 (1991).
67. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 229. North Dakota law establishes that if a trust under review could
reasonably be interpreted as a support trust, the assets of the trust can be considered assets of the
beneficiary for the purpose of computing eligibility. N.D. ADM1N.CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(3) (1994);
see Chenot v. Bordeleau, 561 A.2d 891, 894 (R.I. 1989) (relying on six references of the trustee's sole
discretionary powers within the testamentary instrument in finding that a father of a developmentally
disabled son had created a discretionary trust for the benefit of his son).
68. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 231.
69. Id.; see N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(3) (stating that the term "support trust" also in-
cludes trusts which are called "discretionary support trusts" or "discretionary trusts," so long as sup-
port is a trust purpose). The Department contended that this regulation was the determining factor in
interpreting a trust for the purposes of Medicaid eligibility. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 231.
70. Hecker, 527 N.w.2d at 231. In response to the Department's application of section 75-02-
02.1-31(3), Hecker argued that the code section was void, as it overruled judicial precedent and
exceeded the rule making authority of the Department. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 232.
71. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 234. Upon review of this contention, the court concluded that the
Department had erroneously based this contention on North Dakota Administrative Code section
75-02-02.1-31(7), which applies only to support and Medicaid-qualifying trusts. Id.; see N.D. ADMIN.
CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(7) (establishing that the amount available to the beneficiary of a "special
needs" trust is the maximum amount permitted to be distributed under the trust).
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applied by the Department, would overrule the explicit intent of the
settlor of the Hecker trust.72 This result would supersede North Dakota
case law holding that the settlor's intent determines whether a trust is a
support or discretionary trust. 73  Therefore, the court declared this
portion of the North Dakota Administrative Code void. 74
Additionally, the Court concluded that the Hecker trust assets could
not qualify as available assets under the federal definition of availability
because Hecker had no legal ability to compel distribution. 75 However,
by applying federal financial methodology, Hecker would qualify for
Medicaid. 76 Since the Department's regulation rendered Hecker ineligi-
ble for Medicaid, it was more restrictive than the federal financial meth-
odology, and thus, invalid. 77 Consequently, the Department's regulation
which declared discretionary trust fund assets as available assets for
eligibility purposes7 8 was rendered void and unenforceable. 79
The court stated that North Dakota case law firmly supported the
public policy concept that medical assistance should be available only to
the truly needy, so that applicants are required to exhaust their own
resources before they can qualify for assistance programs.80 The court
found that allowing Hecker to qualify for medical assistance, even
though he was a trust beneficiary, would be consistent with this line of
cases.81 The court concluded that the assets of the Hecker trust were not
assets of Hecker himself, nor did he have a legal right to the proceeds of
the trust or to compel any distribution of the trust principal or income. 82
Thus, the court determined that Hecker should be classified as a truly
72. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 231; see N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(3).
73. See Bohac v. Graham, 424 N.W.2d 144, 146 (N.D. 1988); In re Larson, 341 N.W.2d 627, 629
(N.D. 1983). There is no North Dakota statutory authority permitting the department to over-rule case
law and declare this type of a discretionary trust to be an available asset for eligibility purposes. Cf.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501B.89 (West Supp. 1994) (making unenforceable any provision in a trust which
attempts to make assets unavailable to a beneficiary if that beneficiary applies for or is declared
eligible for any type of public assistance program). The dissent did not agree that the depart-ment had
superseded judicial precedent by its regulation. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 236 (VandeWalle, C.J.,
dissenting). The dissent contended that the department has specific power under state statute to enact
the regulations necessary to determine medical assistance eligibility for needy persons. Hecker, 527
N.W.2d at 236: see N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-02(3) (1991) (limiting eligibility for medical as-
sistance to those meeting criteria established by the department of human services). The dissent stated
that the majority's reliance on Bohac v. Graham was misplaced because the court in Bohac decided
the issue of what the trustor intended, and not the issue of how the trustor's intent affects the appli-
cant's eligibility for medical assistance under the department regulations. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at
236-37 (VandeWalle, CJ., dissenting).
74. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 232.
75. Id.; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a)(1) (1995); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(iii) (1994).
76. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 233.
77. Id.; see 42 C.F.R. § 435.601(d)(3) (1994).
78. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(3) (1994).
79. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 233-34.
80. Id. at 234; see In re McMullen, 470 N.W.2d 196 (N.D. 1991); Bohac v. Graham, 424 N.W.2d
144 (N.D. 1988); Penuel v. Penuel, 415 N.W.2d 497 (N.D. 1987).




needy person. 8 3 As a result, the Hecker trust was not found unenforce-
able since it did not conflict with public policy. 84
Similarly, the court stated the Hecker trust could not be successfully
challenged on the public policy grounds of a parent's duty to support a
child.85 The court said that North Dakota public policy concerning this
issue is well established. 86 The burden of supporting the disabled falls
on the state once they reach adulthood. 87 The court noted that although
Wilhelmina Hecker was Herman's mother, she had no legal duty to
support her disabled son in his adulthood.88 The court stated the lack
of legal duty to support is a factor to be considered when attempting to
make an inference of the settlor's intent. 89 ,
The court also rejected the Department's contention that most
individuals with substantial assets would prefer to support needy relatives
rather than forcing them to rely on public assistance on the ground that
public assistance was no longer necessarily seen as charity. 90 The majori-
ty, adopting a statement of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, concluded that
there was no public policy prohibiting an individual with no duty to
support from giving a charity patient "extra comforts or luxuries." 91
Finding no violation of public policy, the majority ruled that the
Hecker trust was a discretionary trust, its assets not "available" for the
purpose of determining Medicaid eligibility. 92 The court concluded that
the Department could not, absent legislative authority, include the trust






88. Id.; accord Freyer v. Freyer, 427 N.W.2d 348, 340 (N.D. 1988) (holding that parental duty to
support generally terminates at the age of majority); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-25 (1994)
(considering the financial ability of a parent of a disabled child in determining Medicaid eligibility only
until the child reaches eighteen years of age).
89. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 236.
90. Id. For similar treatment in other jurisdictions, see for example, Town of Randolph v.
Roberts, 195 N.E.2d 72 (Mass. 1964), Estate of Escher, 407 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. 1978), Lang v.
Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1987).
91. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 236 (citing In re Wright's Will, 107 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Wis. 1961)).
In a strong dissent, Chief Justice VandeWalle noted his earlier and continuing opposition to a public
policy which would allow eligibility for public assistance while the recipient's family holds substantial
assets. Id. (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting) (quoting from his dissent in Nielson v. County Soc. Servs.
Bd.. 395 N.W.2d 157, 163 (N.D. 1986)). Admitting that the majority's position was supported in other
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the matter to the Department, instructing them to redetermine Herman's
eligibility for Medicaid without considering the trust corpus as an asset.
94
IV. IMPACT
As a result of Hecker, a disabled individual's eligibility for medical
assistance benefits may be affected if the applicant is a trust beneficiary.
Under Hecker, assets held in a support trust may affect a beneficiary's
eligibility for public assistance programs. However, assets held in a
discretionary trust are not available to, or under the control of, the
beneficiary and do not affect the beneficiary's eligibility.
As a result of this distinction, a settlor who wishes to create a special
needs or supplemental trust to benefit a disabled individual without
making him or her ineligible for governmental assistance must create a
discretionary trust. A settlor must clearly evidence his or her intent by
including in the trust instrument a statement of purposes or goals. An
incorporation of the statement of purposes is especially important if the
state in which the trust is executed is one, like North Dakota, in which a
settlor's intent determines how the trust is classified.
Additionally, the trust instrument must clearly preserve for a trustee
the sole discretion to distribute trust assets as he or she sees fit. The sole
discretionary power of a trustee completely removes the trust assets from
the control of a beneficiary. Following Hecker, assets which are unavail-
able to a beneficiary do not affect his or her eligibility for public assis-
tance.
Although the Hecker court clarified the relationship between
availability of trust assets and eligibility for public assistance programs,
this issue will continue to require judicial review and refinement. This
review will be necessitated by the continually rising costs of medical and
institutional care for the disabled and aged. As the number of elderly in
need of health care steadily rises in the coming years, the financial
burdens on the states will likewise increase. States will likely respond
with attempts to insure that only those who have no alternative means of
support receive government assistance. In determining eligibility, there
will be an increased focus on identifying all available resources.
The availability of resources held in a discretionary trust may be
affected by future legislative action. First, state agencies may request
94. Id. Of interest is the Department's argument in a petition for rehearing that North Dakota, as
a "section 209(b) state," should be allowed to use eligibility criteria for the "medically needy" which
are more restrictive than that of the SSI program. Pet. for Reh'g at 1, Hecker (No. 94-0180).
However, the court dismissed the petition without addressing North Dakota's section 209(b) status.
Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 237. In dismissing, the court concluded that "[a] state's § 209(b) status does
not insulate it from complying with the federal requirement that assets be actually available to an
applicant." Id. (citing Dokos v. Miller. 517 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (N.D. Il. 1981)).
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legislative changes in the public assistance statutes s~o that trust assets
could be declared available for the purpose of determining eligibility for
state assistance programs. Secondly, the federal government may amend
the Medicaid and SSI eligibility statutes to include all trust interests in
the list of available assets.
Any such actions by the state and/or federal government would
most likely have a chilling effect on families contemplating setting up a
trust to support disabled relatives. As a result, a family may choose to
prevent a disabled family member from owning or having an interest in
any assets. This type of action would serve to impoverish the disabled
individual by discouraging any type of familial support. Consequently,
a state could increasingly find itself providing support for disabled
individuals from affluent families who had previously been receiving
support from their families and had not needed public assistance.
Keeping in mind the rising costs of health care, the end result would
most likely be an overall decrease in benefits to those on assistance,
including those with legitimate needs. This result would be accompanied
by an increase in the financial burden on the state.
To combat just such a result, a state may wish to limit the extent to
which it may seek indemnification from a beneficiary's trust assets. 95
Under this type of limitation, the families of a disabled trust beneficiary
would be required to cooperate with the state by providing a portion of
the trust assets for the support for the disabled individual. This
alternative allows a state to provide only that support which is genuinely
not available to the individual, while protecting some of the trust corpus
for the future support of the disabled beneficiary. Limiting liability in
such a manner would not discourage families from providing trusts to
benefit disabled relatives in the same way that breaking the trust would.
If either the income or the principal of a discretionary trust were
seized by the state for the support of a needy beneficiary, the likely
result would be the exhaustion of the trust. 96 Mindful of the high costs
of medical and institutional care, it is highly probable that such assets of
the trust would be of no real consequence in assisting the state with the
support of a disabled or institutionalized beneficiary. However, if a state
honors the settlor's intent of a properly established discretionary trust,
the trust would be able to provide for the disabled beneficiary an oppor-
tunity of a better life, one funded beyond the bare basics of public
assistance.
Brenda R. Foyt
95. See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. A NN. art. 5547-300 § 61(g) (West 1991) (providing that trust
assets are only liable for government care to beneficiaries within certain limits).
96. Lawrence A. Frolik, Discretionary Trusts for a Disabled Beneficiary: A Solution or a Trap for
the Unwary?, 46 U. Ptrr. L. REV. 335, 371 (1985).
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